Defence and Decolonisation in South-East Asia by Karl Hack

Author:Karl Hack [Hack, Karl]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Social Science, Ethnic Studies, General, Regional Studies
ISBN: 9781136839016
Google: pdZcAgAAQBAJ
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2013-12-16T05:55:07+00:00

DIEN BIEN PHU AND THE LOSS OF TONKIN

In early 1954 British planners found themselves in the eye of a storm, awaiting the scheduled Geneva Conference on Korea and Indochina, and the results of the battle at Dien Bien Phu. It was clear by March that the French would offer real concessions in Geneva, in order to satisfy public desires to end seven years of ‘la sale guerre’.1 The COS were also coming to accept that the tide was not going to swing back in France’s favour. Between the beginning of March and 1 April the Foreign Office responded by thrashing out a new ‘Policy on Indochina’ paper, with the endorsement of the COS and Eden. This recognised that France might be determined to reach a settlement at Geneva come what may. It suggested that the best agreement they could hope for include the partition of Vietnam, and the preservation an independent Cambodia and Laos.2

Even the irrepressibly optimistic MacDonald had by 18 March recognised that a choice between the evils of Viet Minh participation in a national government, or partition, might be unavoidable. It was feared that the only alternative, increased American involvement, might divert resources from Europe, could cause war with China, and possibly invoke the Sino-Soviet treaty. Dulles came to believe that this fear of tumbling into nuclear war exercised a morbid effect on British policy.3

In early April Lieutenant-General Charles Loewen, the Commander-in-Chief of Far East Land Forces, confirmed after visiting Indochina that the problem should be seen as primarily politico-military (like Malaya) rather than military-strategic. His report revealed Viet Minh infiltration was spreading in the South as well as the North. On the 10 April the COS reaffirmed that, even if the French held at Dien Bien Phu, they lacked the resources to maintain control throughout Indochina. Threats aimed at causing China to cease supplying the Viet Minh would be ineffective without including atomic war. Unless Britain was willing to risk tripping war with China and perhaps with the Soviet Union too, it would have to accept either communist participation in a coalition government or partition. The COS favoured partition, a coalition would result in communist domination of all Indochina.4

British policy now focused on the possibility of saving a non-communist barrier of countries to the south and west of Tonkin. So long as Cambodia, Laos and South Indochina could be secured, the Mekong River basin would be safeguarded and Thailand shielded from communism.5

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